1961]

LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH
IN THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET RUSSIA *
HARoLD J. BEmMAN t
Much has been written in recent decades about "the place of
psychiatry in the law," and especially about the need to incorporate
into the law insights derived from psychiatric research. Far too little
attention has been given, however, to the closely related question of
the place of law in psychiatry and the need to incorporate into psychiatry insights derived from legal research. Law is not merely a fact
of social life; it is also a body of ideas. Implicit in legal concepts, and
often explicit in them as well, are theories of human personality. Moreover, both through de facto operation and through its concepts and
theories, law-like psychiatry-seeks to influence human personality.
In helping to maintain social order, law at the same time and by the
same token helps to maintain the mental health of the individual
members of society.
Those who think of the road from psychiatry to law as simply a
one-way street are misled, I believe, by the sharp distinction which is
often drawn between the lawyer's concern with social order and the
psychiatrist's concern with individual personality. In one of the best
expositions of what law may learn from psychiatry, we are told that
"the focus of the law is on society primarily, and only secondarily on
the individual; in psychiatry the emphasis is almost exclusively on the
individual." I But the truth is that society and the individual are
really two dimensions of the same thing-man. The law, at least,
cannot separate the two, and psychiatry separates them at its peril.
The word "individual" is, in fact, quite misleading, for it suggests
an isolated being sufficient unto himself and devoid of relationships
with others. Psychiatrists are concerned, of course, not with individuals in this abstract sense but with real people, people who have
mothers and fathers, husbands or wives, children, friends, teachers,
* An address given at the Second Institute on Preventive Psychiatry, State University of Iowa, April 11, 1959. Reprinted with revisions from Berman, Law as an
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fellow workers, and so forth. But it should not be forgotten that these
more intimate relationships of family, neighborhood, school, church,
factory, farm, office, or other face-to-face groups are part of a larger
system of social relationships of city, region, country, civilization, and
indeed mankind. The so-called individual is not only a father, brother,
son, husband, machinist, alumnus, member of First Church, and the
like; he is also a state-licensed driver of an automobile, mortgagor
of his house under state and federal law, member of a national labor
union, veteran, citizen, Christian, and potential victim of nuclear war.
The larger communities in which he lives, and the law by which they
are to a considerable extent governed, play an important part in shaping
his inner life. Social order and human personality being inextricably
interdependent, the law which helps to create social order helps to
shape the ideas and emotions of the people living in that social order.
It is interesting in this connection to recall that the great French
sociologist Emile Durkheim, in demonstrating the social causes of
suicide-the fact that the rate of suicide varies among different societies
according to differences in social structure and social values-used the
term anomie, literally "absence of law," to denote the type of social
emptiness which is conducive to emotional breakdown.2 One can
carry this idea further if one tries to imagine a complex society such
as our own existing without law. Unless some substitute were found,
fears, frustrations, aggressive desires, and other emotional disturbances
would be likely to become overpowering. Indeed, there is some evidence that the weakness of law in the international order-that is, the
prospect of a nuclear war-sometimes gives rise to such emotional
disturbances today.
In helping to give order to people's relationships with each other
-not only order but order corresponding in some degree to the community's sense of justice-law performs a therapeutic function for the
members of society. As the English psychiatrist Ranyard West has put
it, law controls human aggressiveness, giving a peaceful outlet to the
destructive dispositions which exist in all men and in all societies:
"We ought to be able to regard the law as controlling for us those
qualities in us which we never really master ourselves." 3
Each of the social functions of law has a corresponding psychological function for the individual members of society. Thus the punishment of a criminal, to speak of that aspect of law with which
psychiatrists are perhaps most familiar, may be viewed in social terms
2

DIlKHEIm, LE SUICIDE (1930); cf. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL
See also DE GRAZIA, THE POLITICAL COmmUNITY: A STUDY
ACTION 324-38 (1949).
OF ANom (1948).
3
WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY: A STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PREREQUISITES OF LAW AND OaDER 166-67 (1942).
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as a means of expressing the community's condemnation of the criminal
act (its retributive--or, perhaps better, its expressive-function), or
in psychological terms as a means of appeasing the desire for vengeance
felt by the offender's victims and by those who identify themselves
with his victims; in social terms, as a means of discouraging people
generally from committing crimes (its deterrent function), or in
psychological terms as a means of instilling the moral values of the
community in people's minds; in social terms, as a means of isolating
the offender from the opportunity to commit new crimes at least
during the period of incarceration (its preventive function), or in
psychological terms as a means of strengthening the sense of personal
security of people, their freedom from fear of criminal attacks; in
social terms as a means of correcting the offender and helping to make
him a socially useful person (its rehabilitative function), or in psychological terms as a means of encouraging him to change his emotions,
attitudes, and beliefs. I do not speak now of the extent to which these
various functions are justified or fulfilled, but only of the interaction
of their social and psychological elements.
Underlying these social and psychological functions of criminal
law is a broader function which is rarely, if ever, mentioned. That
is its function of maintaining the community's sense of communityits function of giving the members of the community a sense of belong-"
ing to the community and of sharing its values. Criminal law is important to society not only because of its effects upon people who
commit crimes or upon people who are deterred by it from committing
crimes. It is also important because of what might be called its
integrative function. Criminal law integrates us into our community
and even into the larger community of mankind by teaching us all
what is absolutely required of us as fellow members of society-absolutely required, in the sense that we are held responsible and punishable by society itself for a breach of the requirement. We are taught
by our family, our neighborhood, our church, our school, and other
intimate groups that it is wrong to steal, wrong to use violence, wrong
to tell lies, wrong to evade responsibilities. When we learn that society
itself-the larger community of city, state, nation, and even the international community-condemns theft, aggression, slander, tax evasion,
and similar acts as publicly punishable offenses, we are brought into
a relationship with that larger community and made to feel our membership in it; that feeling of membership provides an essential element
of personal stability and of belonging. Thus criminal law performs a
supporting and integrative function in the life of every person by
reinforcing and expanding the social dimensions of his personality.
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In considering the therapeutic functions of law we should not,
however, confine our attention to criminal law but rather should view
criminal law in the context of the larger body of law of which it is a
part. As in dealing with crimes, so in resolving conflicts between
individuals or groups of individuals over personal injuries, family
responsibilities, labor relations, contract and property rights, civil
liberties, and hosts of other matters which give rise to dispute and
require regulation, the legal process-whether judicial, administrative,
or legislative-helps to maintain not only social equilibrium but also
the psychological equilibrium of individual members of society. It
helps, above all, to give them a sense of their relationship to the community as a whole, a sense of their participation in its values. All
branches of law serve to reduce grievance tensions, to protect normal
expectations, and to teach right attitudes toward each other and
toward society as a whole.4 We need a traffic signal at an intersection
(to use the homeliest of illustrations), with its attendant legal obligation to slow down or stop, because otherwise people coming from
opposite directions might give vent to aggressive impulses toward each
other-either before or after a collision; otherwise people might have
no basis for calculating what the consequences of stopping or going
would be; otherwise people might more readily yield to the temptation
to go even though they know they ought to stop; and otherwise people
might feel that the community has failed to give guidance in an area
in which community guidance is needed.
I have been dealing thus far with the psychological functions of
law in general. But it is apparent that whether law adequately fulfills
these functions depends upon whether certain assumptions about human
personality, implicit in law, are in fact valid. Every legal system presupposes certain qualities in the nature of the people who are subject
to it-certain ideas, certain attitudes, certain emotions, certain capacities and incapacities. To what extent are the values that are expressed
or implied in legal norms and legal procedures actually shared by the
individual members of society? To what extent can they be instilled
by law? To what extent does the human personality actually correspond to the image of man reflected in legal institutions?
Here we may profitably turn to a comparative study of legal
systems, for different systems of law reflect different conceptions of
the nature of man. A thorough study would include many widely
divergent systems. One would like to compare the various conceptions
of human nature reflected in primitive law, in the Canon Law of the
Church, in the law of Islam, in the law of Calvin's Geneva, and in
4
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many other legal systems. Yet there are advantages in confining our
attention to two systems, our own and that of Soviet Russia, which
have enough in common to make them truly comparable and yet
are sufficiently different to provide a perspective.
Let me turn first to some of the features which Soviet law shares
with our own legal system and with the legal systems of continental
European countries (to which it is closer by tradition and inclination).
Soviet law, contrary to what many Americans would suppose, is a
highly developed system with a large body of legislation, with trial
and appellate courts, with codes of criminal law, civil law, labor law,
and family law, with sixty to seventy thousand lawyers and a substantial amount of private litigation. Soviet citizens may own propertyhouses, cars, television sets, and the like (but not land or shops or
factories), may save money, and may within limits dispose of such
property and money by contract and by will. In addition, Soviet
state enterprises-which conduct the bulk of the economic activities
of the Soviet Union-are regulated by law and enter into contracts
with each other for the purchase and sale of goods under limits imposed
by the planning and administrative authorities; there is a very large
amount of litigation between state enterprises in a special system of
courts established to adjudicate disputes arising out of such contracts.
In short, the Soviet social and economic system is regulated to a high
degree by legal norms and procedures which form a complex and
mature system, as contrasted with a primitive legal system such as
that, for example, of the Cheyenne Indians or of the Melanesians.
Turning particularly to criminal law and procedure, we again
find similarities to Western systems, both in general outline and in
many details. The criminal codes make punishable not only crimes
against the state but also personal and property crimes-homicide,
rape, assault, theft, embezzlement, and so forth. Criminal procedure
follows the continental European model: investigation of crimes is
conducted by an examining magistrate who questions the suspects
and witnesses preparatory to issuing an indictment; after indictment
the accused is tried by a court; the burden of proof rests with the
prosecution; and the accused is entitled to a defense counsel. A Soviet
court is interested in the same questions which would concern an
American court: did the accused commit the act with which he is
charged? Did he commit it intentionally? If not intentionally, ought
he to have foreseen the consequences of his act? Was he sane-the
Soviet term is "imputable" ("responsible") -when he acted?
Indeed, the Soviet tests of imputability or nonimputability are
not essentially different from the test of our M'Naghten rules taken
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together with the "irresistible impulse" rule which prevails in some
eighteen states. Specifically, Soviet law defines nonimputability as
the inability of a person "to realize the consequence of his actions or
to control them, as a result of a chronic mental disease, temporary
mental derangement, mental infirmity or other pathological state." '
Thus, the intellectual factor (absence of capacity to realize) and the
volitional factor (absence of capacity to control) are both essential
to nonimputability. Interestingly enough, Soviet law, like ours, also
suspends punishment of a person who is nonimputable at the time of
sentencing and permits the imposition of punishment upon him after
his recovery.'
Psychiatrists may well be shocked and disappointed to discover
that the Soviet lawmakers, starting all over again in the twentieth
century to make a new legal system, have adopted Aristotelian and
Thomistic conceptions of reason and will and have developed a legal
system which, like our own, assumes that in general people are rational
and should be punished for their misdeeds. Indeed, the Soviet experience is some evidence that a belief in freedom of will and in the
capacity of man, through reason, objectively to know reality, is implicit
in all modem systems of law: we can hardly imagine today a law of
contracts which assumes that men do not have intent and knowledge;
or a law of torts which assumes that it is meaningless to say, "he
ought to have known that if he didn't put on his brakes he would
hit me"; or a criminal law which exonerates a defendant on the ground
that his parents brought him up to hate society. Psychiatrists may
complain that such conceptions rest on a false view of human nature;
they may deride the notion that each of us has two little men in the
top of his head, one called Reason and the other called Will. The
lawyers in all countries will answer, "if there is no reason, no choice,
no will, then there can be no law; we will not sacrifice the legal order
to the vagaries of your science."
Yet when we take a closer look at both Soviet and American law,
we find that neither system has been immune to important changes in
concepts of human nature which have come about in the twentieth
century and which are reflected in modern psychiatry. And in looking
more closely we shall also find some of the crucial differences between
Soviet and American law as well as between Soviet and American
psychiatric theories and practices.
The influence of modern psychiatric concepts-especially Freudian
concepts-upon the American legal system during the past forty years,
5 FUNDAMENTAL
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though subtle and indirect, has nevertheless been far-reaching. The
influence is felt less in explicit changes in legal rules than in the interpretation and application of the rules. The law of divorce, for example,
remains more or less unchanged in the books; it is based on the concept of breach of marital duty, of fault, with overtones of sin. Divorce
law in practice, however, has come to be based on the concept of the
incompatibility or maladjustment of two individuals. Similarly, in
many areas of the law of personal injury, the concept of fault has
given way to the concept of distribution of losses among those better
able to bear them than the injured parties. Here the explanation is
usually conceived in social and economic rather than psychological
terms-the worker injured in the course of employment, even though
by his own negligence, requires compensation for he is unable to
protect himself out of his savings; the plaintiff struck by an automobile
or by an exploding bottle is often awarded damages by the jury though
the defendant was not negligent-contrary to the rules expounded
in the judge's charge-on the assumption that the defendant's insurer
is the better "risk-bearer."
But the social-economic rationale has
important psychological implications: the independent self-reliant individual who bears the risks of his own negligence and profits from
his own prudence has been replaced, in much of our operative legal
thinking, by the dependent, indeed virtually helpless, individual who
needs protection. This is not to say that divorce on grounds of mutual
incompatibility or tort liability without fault could not exist without
modem psychiatric concepts; they have existed in other societies which
had quite other concepts of man. But it seems likely that in our
society these developments in law are connected with a breakdown
of an older psychology. Personal injury law, like divorce law, is
more and more seen in terms of the readjustment of an unfortunate
situation rather than in terms of fault. No one needs to be blamed;
the parties are simply victims of life-perhaps even of their own
accident-proneness.
Many other illustrations of this subtle shift in legal psychology
(though it would be wrong to suggest that it is more than a tendency)
could be adduced from civil law, not to mention administrative law;
its most striking expression, however, is found in criminal law. We
have decided that a youth under eighteen, or under sixteen, is not
subject to criminal punishment at all; he is to be judged on the basis
not of what he did but of his whole personality, and treated in terms
of correction rather than penalty. In some states the sex offender,
and in some states the alcoholic, although sane in the traditional
sense, are also exonerated from public condemnation as criminals and
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subject only to medical psychiatric treatment. Moreover, in the past
few years we have seen the adoption by the District of Columbia
courts of a rule hitherto in force only in New Hampshire that a person
is not criminally responsible for an unlawful act which was the product
of mental illness or mental defect, without reference to whether he had
the capacity to control his conduct.7 These special rules for juveniles,
for sexual psychopaths and alcoholics, and for the mentally ill reflect
a more general tendency in modern criminal law to view the person
who has committed an antisocial act as a victim of his heredity and
environment rather than as a free, rational, moral agent-a tendency
by no means explicit in the criminal law generally but implicit in
much of its administration.
If we turn to the influence of Soviet psychological concepts upon
Soviet law, we find quite a different story. In the first place, since
Soviet psychology and psychiatry are required to conform to the
general doctrines laid down by the Communist Party and since the
law, too, is subject to the same doctrines, it is not surprising that
there is no such open clash between psychiatric and legal concepts
in the Soviet Union as there is in the United States. Soviet psychologists and psychiatrists are not permitted to publish ideas which the
Party leadership considers harmful to the social (including the legal)
,order; but by the same token, Soviet law in general conforms to the
concepts of human personality held by Soviet psychologists and psychiatrists. Thus a synthesis is achieved between psychiatry and lawpartly at the expense of both and partly to their mutual benefit.
Soviet theories of human personality are conceived in Pavlovian
rather than in Freudian terms." Freud's emphasis on the role of the
unconscious is rejected. "Conscious understanding" and "conscious
purposive action" are considered the key to human personality. At
the same time, great stress is placed upon the possibility of influencing
human thought, feeling, and action by environmental changes. It is
the Soviet view that man is conditioned but that through conscious
effort he can rise above his conditions. Indeed, training and selftraining have been declared to be categories separate from environment and heredity in the shaping of human personality.
The concept of man expressed in Soviet psychological writings
is in many respects close to the traditional Western legal concept of
the free, rational, moral agent. Deterministic conceptions which were
prevalent for many years have been denounced since the mid-1930's.
7 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); cf. Note, Inplenzentation and Clarification of the Durham Criterion of Criminal Irresponsibility,
58 COLUm. L. REv. 1253 (1958).
8
See generally BAuER, THE NEW MAN IN SOVIET PSYCHOLOGY (1952).
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The individual is said to be responsible for his behavior-responsible,
indeed, for his own character.
On the other hand, Soviet psychological theory emphasizes that
it is society which sets the conditions for the development of the
individual human personality; and in the Soviet Union, at least, society
does so consciously and purposely in order to achieve definite psychological objectives. The family, the school, social organizations, social
institutions such as law, and, above all, the Communist Party, have
the task of seeking to inculcate feelings of social responsibility, duty,
courage, love of country, devotion to the Party, and a Communist
Weltanschauung.10
A true story of Soviet psychologists in action may reveal more
than these generalizations can about their concept of man and of the
role of society in shaping his personality. Professor Henry Murray,
the Harvard psychologist, reports that during recent conversations
with Soviet psychologists in Moscow he was told of an experiment
conducted with small children. If a three-year-old child is told that
at a certain signal-the flashing of a light-he is to squeeze a certain
ball once, it is apparently very difficult for him to obey. He may
squeeze the ball before the light flashes or may squeeze it several times
after the light flashes. However, the Soviet psychologists told Professor Murray, they were able to get the child to perform the requested
act by first teaching him to say, "when the light goes on I will squeeze
the ball once." By teaching him, in other words, to give himself the
command, they were able to persuade him to overcome the negativism
characteristic of his age-group. The next step was to teach him to
form the words in his mouth without vocalizing them and then squeeze
the ball. Ultimately the child was taught simply to think the words
and then perform the act.
The key not only to Soviet psychology but also to Soviet law is
conscious conditioning of emotions, attitudes, and beliefs. What I
have spoken of as the therapeutic function of law becomes, in Soviet
theory and practice, its primary function-its raison d'etre; it becomes,
indeed, one of the principal determining factors not only of legislation
but even of judicial decision. Soviet jurists speak of this in terms of
the "educational role" of law. Thus Soviet family law is designed to
teach the members of the family to accept their mutual responsibilities:
9 "A man takes part in the shaping of his own character and he himself bears a
PsIKHl oGII
Os NovY OBsscI
responsibility for that character." RuBINSTE I,

475 (1946), quoted in BAUER, op. cit. supra note 8, at 149.

10 "The early years of childhood play an essential role in the development of
character. However, the Freudian notion that character is fixed in early childhood
is erroneous. This error arises from the failure to understand the role of consciousness
in character development. Man takes an active part in reshaping his own character
to the extent that it is related to a Weltanschauung . . . ." RUBINSHTIN, OsNovY
op. cit. supra note 8, at 150.
475 (1946), quoted in BAux,
oIxoLoGn
OBsHcExx Ps
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since 1944 divorce has been made relatively difficult, especially where
there are children to be cared for; the network of family economic
responsibilities is very wide, with grandparents and grandchildren having mutual obligations of support. Similarly, Soviet tort law is designed to teach people to be careful, and even in workmen's compensation cases the element of fault enters to permit an injured worker to
recover from the state business enterprise his full losses, and not merely
the statutory tariff, where the injury was due to the negligence of
management. And Soviet contract law is designed not only to teach
respect for contracts ("contract discipline") but also to teach people,
especially business managers, how to utilize contracts in the interests
of the general economic plan as well as in the interests of their individual state enterprises.
To say that Soviet law has an educational, or therapeutic, function is only to say that it is like the legal systems of other countries;
the difference is that in the case of Soviet law that function is not
merely implicit but explicit, not merely incidental but central to the
very determination of rights and duties. American contract law, too,
helps to teach people what kinds of agreements to make, but that is
not often thought to be an express purpose of our contract law; only
occasionally are our legislatures concerned with such teaching and it
does not generally have a direct bearing upon the decision of a court.
The Soviet legislature, on the other hand, is concerned very much with
the kinds of contracts people may make, and even when deciding a
dispute over an alleged breach of contract the Soviet court will quite
often be interested in the question of whether the agreement was properly drawn from the point of view of the parties' mutual interests as
well as from that of society's interests. Indeed, in the sphere of economic contracts between state business enterprises there is a special
"pre-contract procedure" whereby the court in effect writes the contract for the parties if they are in dispute as to what its terms should be.
The point becomes clearer, perhaps, by illustration from Soviet
criminal law, where the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused may depend upon the educational value of such a determination
for him and for society. The extreme case, both in Soviet and American law, is that of the juvenile offender; under both systems,. a fifteenyear-old boy who deliberately robs a store, for example, is held not to
be guilty of a crime, because it is believed that to subject him to social
condemnation is not good for him or for society; on the other hand,
though his theft might have been a very minor one, he may be subjected to confinement in a reformatory for an indefinite period-a far
more severe punishment, perhaps, than a mature man might receive
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for the same act-not because of what he did but because of what he
is. The mature man, on the other hand, under our system is not
supposed to be punished for what he is but only for what he did. Under
the Soviet system, however, questions of motivation, of attitude, and
of character enter into the very finding of criminal intent and criminal
negligence. This has been true particularly in the area of crimes
against the state--called, until December 1958, "counter-revolutionary
crimes." It is true also in many other spheres of criminal law. Soviet
writers state, and Soviet judicial decisions bear them out, that the
specific intent of the accused to do the particular act-to shoot the
victim-must be considered in the whole context of his beliefs, his will,
and his emotions. Depending on his whole personality, his guilt may
be increased or diminished. Indeed, under an express provision of the
Soviet criminal code, if the actor no longer constitutes a social danger
at the time of trial he may be acquitted.
Thus fault, wrong, duty, will, intent, and other moral and rational
concepts of law are retained, but their function is changed: they are
not only means of determining legal rights but also--and perhaps primarily-means of training people to be industrious, honest, cooperative, efficient, resourceful, responsible, and, above all, loyal citizens.
Indeed, rights are conferred by the Soviet state in order to encourage
such virtues, in order to develop the very kind of human personality
which Soviet psychologists proclaim to be the "new Soviet man."
But there is an underlying paradox involved: if the "new Soviet
man" is what he is said to be, why is so much conditioning necessary?
In fact he is not yet what he is said to be. He still needs training. He
is therefore treated not as a mature, independent adult but as an immature, dependent youth who must be \guided and disciplined. His
rights are not his by inherent right but are his as gifts of the State,
given conditionally in return for his loyalty to the State. Indeed, when
the State has felt itself threatened, it has withdrawn altogether the
rights of many and has substituted terror as a means of training. Even
where no question of politics as such is involved, individual rights are
insecure insofar as they are interpreted as instruments of educating the
"new Soviet man' to accept his social responsibilities.
Thus both Soviet psychiatry and Soviet law have suffered by
their intermarriage. Soviet psychiatry has been almost totally cut off
from research into the unconscious area of human personality. Soviet
law has been deprived of security against political intervention. Both
are used as instruments for the creation of a society unified by the
world-view of the Communist Party. At the same time they both have
derived certain benefits from their union. The emphasis in Soviet
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psychology-carried over into psychiatry-upon conscious purposive
action, upon the integration of personal and social goals, and upon the
creation of social conditions conducive to such an integration is not
only an important supporting element in the lives of normal, or well,
people, but also has certain advantages as a basis for treating some
kinds of mental illness.
It is difficult to assess Soviet psychiatric practice in view of the
paucity of our information about mental illness in the Soviet Union.
Soviet psychiatrists have said that the incidence of "serious" mental
illness is about the same, in proportion to the population, as in Western
Europe and the United States, and such statistics as are available seem
We may suppose that the enormous
to support their conclusion."
political and ideological pressure imposed by the Party leadership (the
purges of the late 1930's which sent hundreds of thousands of people
to labor camps in remote regions of Siberia on the flimsiest of charges
and with secret administrative trials are an example) coupled with
crowded living conditions and shortages of consumer goods have
created anxieties, frustrations, fears, depression, and similar emotional
disturbances among large numbers of Soviet citizens. At the same
time, very little is known about the social causes of mental illness, and
it may be that the psychological effects of regimentation and even of
common suffering and sacrifice are by no means so debilitating to
mental health as is popularly supposed. Certainly one senses in the
Soviet Union today that the common suffering which the Russian
people have shared during the past forty years contributes to a sense
of solidarity and even of mission among large numbers of people, and
at the same time that there is a widespread sharing of pride in the
economic, technological, and social progress which has been made by
the country as a whole.
If we turn from speculations concerning the state of mind, so to
speak, of the people of the Soviet Union to what we know more surely
concerning Soviet psychiatry, we find some striking differences between the system of psychiatric care in the Soviet Union and that
which prevails in the United States. In the first place, although the
total number of hospital beds in the two countries is about the sameapproximately 1,500,000-the number of psychiatric beds is not more
than 13 per cent of the total in the Soviet Union, whereas it is about
Secondly, the number
50 per cent of the total in the United States.'
of doctors and the ratio of doctors to psychiatric patents is far higher
in the Soviet Union than in the United States. There are an estimated
11 Cf. Field, Approaches to Mental Illness in Soviet Society: Some Comparisons
7 SOCIAL PROB. 277, 278 (1960).
and Conjectures,
12
Id. at 282, table 2. Cf. GORMAN, EVERY OTHER BED (1956).
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15,000 Soviet psychiatrists out of a total of 360,000 doctors, compared
with about 10,000 American psychiatrists out of a total of about
200,000 doctors. (The total populations of the two countries are approximately 210,000,000 and 175,000,000, respectively.) In Soviet
hospitals there is an average of one doctor to about 27 psychiatric
patients, whereas in American public mental hospitals the ratio is one
doctor to over 180 patients. 3 Finally, Soviet psychiatric patients are
generally treated in neuropsychiatric clinics, of which there were 2,327
in 1956,14 and are, in addition, cared for through a variety of social
devices: workshops and, factories for psychiatric patients, psychiatric
colonies where patients engage in agricultural work, rehabilitation
centers, and, perhaps most important, state subsidies for families to
take care of the mentally ill at home.
Leaving aside the important question of the quality of Soviet
psychiatry, which I am not competent to judge, it is apparent that
pervading the Soviet system of care for the mentally ill is the concept
that such care is the responsibility not only of the psychiatrist but also
of others. Hospitalization, which in the United States is by far the
chief instrument of psychiatric care, is reserved in the Soviet Union
largely for acute cases. The idea is very strong in the Soviet Union
that in many instances-perhaps in most-the patient may be treated
effectively by changing his environment-by moving him, for example,
to other surroundings, changing his job, or putting him in a special
psychiatric workshop, factory or agricultural colony, or rehabilitation
center. Above all, care at home is seen as a major factor in the social
treatment of mental illness-a solution which is perhaps more readily
acceptable in a society like the Soviets' in which the majority of people
live in agricultural communities. 15
Thus the emphasis of Soviet psychiatry on social conditioning,
together with the emphasis of Soviet law on inculcating moral and
134 Field,

supra note 11, at 285.
1 Id. at 287.
15 Dr. Field suggests that possibly the shortage of psychiatric beds may have
stimulated the use of other methods of treatment of the mentally ill in the Soviet
Union. Id. at 285-86. He adds: "It may also be remembered that it was precisely a
shortage of psychiatric beds that launched one of the more exciting approaches to
mental illness in the West. This is the system of emergency psychiatry or psychiatric
. Querido befirst-aid pioneered by Dr. A. Querido in Amsterdam, Holland . .
lieves that: '. . . in the last analysis, the cure or the adaptation of the mentally

disturbed can be accomplished only in society and a successful stay in society is the
only real test of any therapeutic endeavor. The removal of the mentally disturbed
from his background implies the sidestepping of the nucleus of the problem."' Dr.
Field states: "The main contribution the Soviets have made, lies, probably, in their
concepts of not condemning psychotic patients to the idle, demoralizing, de-socializing,
untherapeutic and wasteful life of the chronic patient in the large mental hospital.
Concomitant with this approach, is the bringing of psychiatric care into the community, even into the patient's, home if necessary, and the linking of this treatment

with the general network of medical facilities maintained under a system of socialized
medicine."

Id. at 296.
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intellectual attitudes and ideas, combine to create a rather good social
atmosphere and rather good social institutions for the treatment of the
mentally ill, despite the harm which is done to psychiatry itself as a
science by the arbitrary exclusion of Freudian insights.
Turning finally to the benefits which Soviet law derives from its
marriage, so to speak, to Soviet psychiatry, I would like to refer briefly
The provisions
to the use of psychiatrists in criminal proceedings.'
of Soviet law regarding the use of psychiatrists in judicial proceedings
are more satisfactory from almost any point of view than the corresponding provisions of the law in any of the states of the United States.
Under Soviet law, the testimony of a qualified psychiatric expert is
required both in the preliminary investigation of a crime and upon
trial, if any question arises as to the psychiatric condition of the person
charged. In the United States, only California and Indiana require
that the court call a psychiatric expert in cases involving the defense
of insanity, and only Massachusetts has a procedure for a routine
psychiatric examination prior to trial of persons charged with certain
offenses. Under Soviet law there is provision for a joint examination
by opposing psychiatrists, and in proper cases a joint report. In the
United States, there is no such provision--except under the Uniform
Expert Testimony Act, which has been adopted in no state. Soviet
law provides for the commitment of the accused to a hospital prior to
examination in appropriate cases. Only eighteen American states have
similar provisions. Under Soviet law only a qualified psychiatric expert is permitted to testify concerning the mental illness of the accused.
Under American law, in all jurisdictions, such testimony may be given
by any doctor. Psychiatrists' expenses and fees, under Soviet law, may
be assessed to the accused if he is guilty, provided he is not indigent;
if he is not guilty, or if he is guilty but indigent, they are assessed to
the state treasury; moreover, a psychiatrist, whether called by the
investigator, by the court, or by the accused, may not without sufficient
reason refuse to appear and give his conclusions.
The use of psychiatrists in criminal cases in the Soviet Union is
strongly influenced by the work of a special institute, the Serbskii
Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, which is under the Ministry of Health
of the U.S.S.R. American psychiatrists and lawyers might well study
the work of this Institute, which has been in existence since 1922, with
the thought of forming-under private auspices-an American Institute of Forensic Psychiatry, which like the Serbskii Institute would be
6
. See generally PRoBLEmY SUDFBNOI PSIKHIATRII [PROBLEMS OF FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY] (Buneev ed. 1957) ; SUDEBNAIA PSIKHIATRrlA [FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY]
(Buneev ed. 1954); Berman & Hunt, Criminal Law and Psychiatry: The Soviet
Solution, 2 STAN. L. REv. 635 (1950).
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a scientific research institute and a means of training experts who, on
request by a court, could provide psychiatric testimony before, during,
or after trial. The Law-Medicine Research Institute established at
Boston University in 1958 is an important first step in this direction.
As in the United States generally, Soviet forensic psychiatrists are
called upon to testify not only as to the mental illness of the accused
but also as to his capacity to know the nature of his acts and to control
his conduct. At the same time, the Soviet court is required to consider
in detail his psychiatric condition in determining the question of his
nonimputability, and a conviction (or an acquittal!) may be reversed
on appeal if the court has failed to state the medical as well as the legal
foundations for its decision. Thus the juxtaposition of medical and
legal criteria is maintained in both procedural and substantive law.
This is more readily possible in Soviet Russia than here, it seems to
me, because the distance between psychiatry and law is not nearly so
great there as here.
It might appear to some that the analysis which I have given leads
to the suggestion that we adopt Soviet methods of dealing with the
problems of mental illness, especially as they come up in court proceedings. That suggestion is very far from what I am driving at. Soviet
law and psychiatry are both distorted by Communist doctrines and
Communist practices which are entirely unacceptable to anyone who
believes in freedom; both the lawyer and the psychiatrist are subject to
official pressures which we would consider intolerable. The point is
rather that the study of the Soviet system enables us to understand our
own system better. It shows us that our own backwardness in the
development of proper procedures for the use of psychiatrists in criminal cases is due not only to the mistrust of psychiatry by the lawyers
but also to the failure of the psychiatrists to face squarely the requirements of a sound legal order. We need, I submit, more effort on the
part of psychiatrists to accept whatever there is of value in traditional
legal concepts. We need to have more attention given by psychiatrists
to the role of the conscious in mental illness and to the possibilities of
treatment by environmental and social changes. We need cooperation
between psychiatrists and lawyers in devising new social methods of
care for the mentally ill outside of hospitals. We must at all costs
avoid any solution which would inhibit the freedom and independence
either of psychiatry or of law; but we surely can, through freedom,
match what the Russians have done through force.
In "matching" the Soviet cooperation between law and psychiatry,
we should attempt to build into our law and into our psychiatry a
conception of man which is more complete and more balanced than
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the Soviet conception. Man is not uniformly the dependent and growing youth of Soviet law; nor is he uniformly the reasonably prudent
man of our legal tradition; nor is he uniformly the victim of his
heredity and early childhood, as much of our psychiatry assumes. The
varieties of social experience call forth many diverse aspects of his
personality. Depending on his situation, he may have the helplessness
of a child, the youth's capacity for dedication and service, the selfconfidence and assertiveness of a young man, the prudent maturity of
middle age, the wisdom of old age. A healthy legal system will give
reflection and reinforcement in procedural and substantive rights and
duties, at appropriate times and appropriate places, to all the various
phases of man's nature. A healthy science of psychiatry can play an
important part in the development of such a legal system.

